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The article explores the possibilities of formalizing and explaining the mechanisms that
support spatial and social perspective alignment sustained over the duration of a social
interaction. The basic proposed principle is that in social contexts the mechanisms
for sensorimotor transformations and multisensory integration (learn to) incorporate
information relative to the other actor(s), similar to the “re-calibration” of visual receptive
fields in response to repeated tool use. This process aligns or merges the co-actors’
spatial representations and creates a “Shared Action Space” (SAS) supporting key
computations of social interactions and joint actions; for example, the remapping between
the coordinate systems and frames of reference of the co-actors, including perspective
taking, the sensorimotor transformations required for lifting jointly an object, and the
predictions of the sensory effects of such joint action. The social re-calibration is proposed
to be based on common basis function maps (BFMs) and could constitute an optimal
solution to sensorimotor transformation and multisensory integration in joint action or
more in general social interaction contexts. However, certain situations such as discrepant
postural and viewpoint alignment and associated differences in perspectives between
the co-actors could constrain the process quite differently. We discuss how alignment
is achieved in the first place, and how it is maintained over time, providing a taxonomy
of various forms and mechanisms of space alignment and overlap based, for instance,
on automaticity vs. control of the transformations between the two agents. Finally, we
discuss the link between low-level mechanisms for the sharing of space and high-level
mechanisms for the sharing of cognitive representations.
Keywords: joint action, perspective taking, basis function, sensorimotor transformation, spatial alignment,mental
alignment, social interaction
INTRODUCTION
Goodale and Milner (1992) proposed a segregation into
perception-for-identification (of objects) vs. perception-for-
action and empirically corroborated this claim in later work relat-
ing the former to the ventral (occipito-temporal) and the latter
to the dorsal (occipito-parietal) processing stream, respectively
(Milner and Goodale, 2008). While the ventral stream seems to
employ relative metrics based on an environment-/object-based
frame of reference (FOR), the dorsal perception-for-action stream
codes “real” distances within an egocentric FOR (Aglioti et al.,
1995; Ganel et al., 2008). This distinction is crucial in the present
context, where we will focus primarily on perception-for-action
and the properties of the dorsal stream.
The way we organize and neurally represent the space around
us in the dorsal stream is functional to action performance and
not only to the description of where objects are (Goodale and
Milner, 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1997). During sensorimotor learn-
ing, the actions we perform shape our perceptual representations
so that they support efficient sensorimotor transformations such
as the calculation of the motor commands required to achieve
a goal (e.g., reaching and grasping an object) and the predic-
tion of the sensory consequences of actions (Wolpert et al.,
1995; Pouget et al., 2002). These sensorimotor transformations
are often (but not exclusively) linked to a brain network that
includes the dorsal processing stream, i.e., the posterior parietal
cortex (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Ferraina et al., 2009a), the
premotor cortex (Graziano et al., 1994; Rizzolatti and Luppino,
2001), yet, also the cerebellum (Wolpert et al., 1995; Kawato,
1999).
This tight relationship between visuo-spatial representations
and actions implies that spatial locations must be encoded in
relation to the instantaneous and multisensory internal represen-
tation of the agent’s body in order to account for the flexibility and
precision of action execution, disregarding other aspects such as
the particular body posture and limb locations in relation to the
environment (Gross and Graziano, 1995).
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This action-based view of visuo-spatial processing in the dorsal
stream predicts that the neuronal mechanisms supporting spatial
perception and multisensory integration should be dynamic. In
this vein, Head and Holmes (1911) have proposed that the brain
maintains and continuously updates a multimodal representation
of the body: a body schema. During movement or learning of
new motor skills, the body schema is updated to code where the
body parts are located in space and what is their configuration.
During development, the body schema is updated to code for new
action possibilities due to growth or the acquisition of new motor
skills. Furthermore, the body schema should incorporate action-
relevant objects and thus be updated when using tools that (for
example) extend the reach. For example, the visual response fields
of bimodal neurons in monkey intraparietal area (modulated by
both somatosensory and visual stimulation) expand as an effect of
tool use to include the entire length of the tool (Maravita and Iriki,
2004). In other words, learning to use novel tools stretches the
body schema or extends the internal representation of the actor’s
hand (Arbib et al., 2009). Patients suffering of hemispatial neglect
in their near space, as a consequence of parietal cortex lesions,
display symptoms in the far space when using a tool to extend
their action potentials (Berti and Frassinetti, 2000). Other studies
showed that tool use also influences perceptual judgments; for
instance, the egocentric distance to a target object is perceived
smaller when holding a tool (Witt and Proffitt, 2008). These
studies suggest that the dynamic aspects of multisensory receptive
fields and perceptual representations depend on the execution
of goal-directed actions, consistent with the idea of a common
coding of perception and action in ideomotor theories (Prinz,
1997).
In this article we extend the principles of the action-based
approach to the case of social interactions. We propose that
co-actors engaged in social interactions and particuarly those
having common goals (e.g., lifting together a table, playing beach
volleyball as a team) are able to include other-agent’s operational
spaces in their own space representation.
Numerous studies have shown that co-actors’ perception-
action loops are not independent but can influence each other
(Sebanz et al., 2006). This evidence can be interpreted using a
non-representational framework that describes interacting agents
as coupled dynamical systems (Kelso et al., 2013). Alternatively,
it has been proposed that co-actors continuously use predictive
mechanisms (e.g., forward models) to predict both one’s own and
another’s actions, and successively integrate this information to
form an action plan (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009). The prediction
of another’s action is often described in terms of an action simula-
tion that reuses the same internal models as those implied in one’s
own motor control (Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Wolpert et al.,
2003; Jeannerod, 2006; Pezzulo et al., 2007, 2013; Dindo et al.,
2011; Pezzulo, 2011a,b). This mechanism is plausibly a costly one,
as it requires planning and controlling one’s own actions while at
the same time simulating the co-actor’s (possibly using the same
internal models for both control and simulation). Furthermore,
simulating another’s actions requires an intermediate computa-
tional step (i.e., transformation) when the actors are not perfectly
aligned in space: an egocentric “shift” from the observer’s to the
observed FOR, which is often called perceptual (Johnson and
Demiris, 2005) or visuo-spatial perspective taking (e.g., Zacks and
Michelon, 2005).
While not denying the importance of the aforementioned
mechanisms based on dynamic coupling and action simulation,
we advance a theoretical proposal based on the idea that an
agent performing a joint action could benefit from an additional
mechanism, a neurally represented “Shared Action Space” (SAS),
which directly incorporates information relative to the co-actor in
one’s ownmechanisms for space representation and sensorimotor
transformation.
SHARED ACTION SPACES SUPPORT JOINT ACTIONS
The basic proposed principle is that in social contexts the
mechanisms for sensorimotor transformations and multisensory
integration (learn to) incorporate information relative to the
co-actor. As an effect, the mechanisms supporting spatial rep-
resentations of both agents are re-calibrated, in analogy to the
re-calibration of visual receptive fields due to tool use (Maravita
and Iriki, 2004). Thus, the co-actors can perceive and act using
a SAS (where the word “shared” is chosen in analogy with the
idea of sharing cognitive representations during joint actions
(Sebanz et al., 2006); see below for a relation between these
phenomena).
The social re-calibration provides a useful ground for per-
forming numerous computations required for joint actions;
for example, remapping coordinate systems and FORs (e.g.,
from my-eye-centered FOR to a your-eye-centered FOR or even
our-position-centered FOR), sensorimotor transformations (e.g.,
learning the movements and amount of force necessary to lift
an object jointly with another agent), and motor-to-sensory
transformations such as forward modeling (e.g., predicting the
sensory consequences of a joint action). The social re-calibration
might thus constitute an optimal solution to sensorimotor trans-
formation andmultisensory integration in joint action or more in
general social interaction contexts.
A SAS is usually extended compared to the individual action
spaces of the co-actors and includes subspaces where actors inter-
act or use othermotor potentials. The extension of the operational
space supports joint actions requiring both simultaneous and com-
plementary actions. Consider for example the case of two persons
lifting a heavy object together and simultaneously. In this case,
the SAS may include social affordances (e.g., lifting affordances)
that are not available to any of the individuals, who would not
be capable of lifting the object by themselves (see also Richardson
et al., 2007).
As an example of complementary actions, consider a beach
volleyball team of two players. The team can reach the ball
everywhere within their half of the field even if each individual
player can only reach a part of it; thus the group’s SAS is extended
compared to the individuals’ operational space. Figure 1 provides
a more detailed specification of the latter case. Three agents (1, 2,
and 3) have their own operational space (S1, S2, S3, respectively)
but also portions overlapping (S4 and S5) where agents could
interact. The sum of S1, S2 and S3 represents the group’s SAS.
Thanks to this space, it is possible for agent 1 to “move” the
cup to the left side of agent 3 even if he cannot physically reach
such location. To perform this action he has first to pass the cup
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FIGURE 1 | A schematic illustration of SAS.
to agent 2 (object in S4); subject 2 will then pass the object to
agent 3 (object in S5) that, finally, will move the cup in the final
position.
Operational spaces are of different significance. S4 and S5
represent “physically” SAS. In S4 both 1 and 2 could physically
interact. The same is for S5 where the interaction is among
2 and 3. The extension and use of S4 and S5 depend on the
inter-subject distance and relative orientation (both influenced by
many factors; see below). However, for each of the subjects, the
action space can be extended to the “virtually” SAS, even when
direct interaction is not possible; for example, moving objects
from S3 to S2 (or from S1 to S2) becomes an available option
for all components of the group. If an agent (say, 1) neurally
represents the virtually SAS, it can execute a single sensorimotor
transformation to (plan to) move the cup from S1 to S3.
This example illustrates that groups such as those shown in
Figure 1 have mixed ownership of space representations. Fur-
thermore, the operational space of group members is extended.
We propose that this phenomenon is produced by the neuronal
mechanisms that support sensorimotor transformations, which
are re-calibrated during social interactions. The re-calibration is
similar to the extension of action possibilities due to tool use,
except that the skills and action repertoires of the other group
members are like “tools” that extend the individual action space
into a SAS affording the achievement of individualistic and joint
goals.
Note however that being physically close to other persons
might not be sufficient to establish a SAS; it depends on the
requirements of the situation as well as various social factors how
(for example) S3 is merged into the shared space. If the action
goal is to simply place the mug on the “far side” of S3 then the
shared space would be a merged space as shown in Figure 1. If
the goal is to place the mug on “left side” of S3 then at least
agent 2 would need to represent S3’s left/right axis taking her
orientation into account. Different situations might require other
kinds of information such as the position, the line of sight, the
goals or even the preferences and motor skills of the co-actor.
Furthermore, since co-actors are not simple tools with only a
passive role, social factors come into play such as the familiarity
and trust of the co-actors in one another, as well the nature of
the social interaction (say, cooperative vs. competitive) and the
type of social context itself (e.g., informal vs. formal). Overall,
then, various task and social requirements affect the way SAS are
generated; see Section Prerequisites for Forming Shared Action
Spaces and a Proposed Taxonomy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section “Neuro-
Computational Mechanisms Supporting Shared Action Spaces”
describes the concept of SAS and proposes a neuro-computational
mechanism for its implementation. Section “Prerequisites for
Forming Shared Action Spaces and a Proposed Taxonomy” dis-
cusses the necessary preconditions for forming SAS and advances
the idea that different mechanisms, based on automatic motor
resonance or on deliberate embodied simulation, could be
required depending on spatial relations and angular disparity
alignment between the agents. Section “Socio-Cognitive Aspects
of the Shared Action Space” discusses the relations between the




The brain of living organisms receives information about the
external world (e.g., the position of an object) from different
sensory modalities (e.g., visual and auditory) and encodes them
using different FORs, for example, eye-centered (i.e., distance
between object and eye) for visual information and head-centered
(i.e., distance between object and eye) for auditory information
(Buneo and Andersen, 2006). Furthermore, information can be
encoded in different coordinate systems; for example, the visual
modality could encode the distance between object and eye
in Cartesian (or polar) coordinates, centered at the eye or at
other body’s parts (Lacquaniti et al., 1995). This multimodal
information is spread in different brain areas; for example, it
has been proposed that the parietal regions could use both eye-
centered and hand-centered coordinates (Buneo et al., 2002;
Ferraina et al., 2009b) and the premotor cortex could use body-
centered representations (Caminiti et al., 1991; Graziano et al.,
1994) or intermediate relative-position codes (Pesaran et al.,
2006).
This information of the external world can be used to solve
different problems in sensorimotor control. A first problem is
multisensory integration, which consists in integrating informa-
tion from different modalities to obtain a robust estimate of
the position of the object, which in turn could require coor-
dinate transformation and the remapping (or combination) of
different coordinate frames. Still another problem is sensorimotor
transformation, such as for example generating motor commands
to reach and grasp the object (which in computational motor
control is usually linked to internal inverse models). Solving this
problem often requires coordinate transformations, too, such as
when an eye-centered FOR used to visually locate the object
has to be transformed in a body-centric or an object-centered
FOR (representing the distance between the target object and the
hand position and, finally, the effector shape) that could be more
appropriate for reaching and grasping it (Jeannerod and Biguer,
1989). The opposite transformation (motor-to-sensory) is often
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required for the sensory prediction of action consequences, which
in computational motor control is often linked to internal forward
models (Wolpert et al., 1995).
A recent computational theory of how the brain implements
multisensory integration and sensorimotor transformations is
the “basis functions” framework of Pouget and Snyder (2000)
and Pouget et al. (2002). We adopt the “basis functions” frame-
work to formulate our theory of SAS (but note that our the-
ory can also be implemented differently and does not strictly
depend on the basis function framework). In the basis function
framework, all the streams of information are bi-directionally
linked to a common basis function map (BFM; see Figure 2
Panel A).
The integration of signals at the level of the BFM (equivalent
to an intermediate layer of a multi-layer network) permits solving
sensorimotor problems using principles of statistical inference.
It permits coordinate transformation because the BFM essentially
encodes locations in multiple frames of reference simultaneously,
creating a mixed FOR. It permits multisensory integration as
multiple estimates (say of an object position) obtained by differ-
ent sensorymodalities (e.g., visual and auditory) can be combined
in a mixed FOR and weighted by the relative reliability of the
sensory modalities (e.g., visual information can be more reliable
than auditory information).
There is indeed physiological evidence for such “combined
representations” between inputs from different propriocep-
tive coordinate systems. Andersen and colleagues (reviewed in
Andersen, 1994) reported neural populations in the macaque
parietal cortex where the preference of specific neurons for a
specific retinal location (i.e., the visual signal) was modulated
by either head position lateral intraparietal (LIP) area or input
form the labyrinth (area 7a). As a whole population such neurons
have been proposed to encode combined maps as modeled by
Pouget and colleagues (Pouget et al., 2002) as well as Andersen
and colleagues (Andersen, 1994). What these results also suggest
is that the egocentric perspective of an agent is the result of
FIGURE 2 | (A) BFMs permit combining different coordinate systems into a unique representation that encodes locations in multiple frames of reference;
figure adapted from Kessler (2000). Panel (B) an equivalent BFM combining representations of different agents.
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the non-linear combination of several proprioceptive FOR that
encode locations simultaneously in eye-, head-, and body-related
coordinates. For action-related coding limb-relative encoding of
spatial locations could be particularly important and has indeed
been reported in parietal area 7b of the macaque brain (Gross and
Graziano, 1995).
Furthermore a basis function model proposed by Pouget and
Sejnowski (1995) and Pouget and Sejnowski (1996) was able to
explain a striking modulation of hemispatial neglect reported by
Karnath et al. (1993). Karnath et al. showed that a stimulus in
the affected hemifield could be perceived much more easily by
neglect patients when they turned their body towards the stim-
ulus. This revealed a direct modulation of eye-centred input by
proprioceptive information about body posture in neglect, which
was elegantly explained by Pouget and Sejnowski’s combined basis
function model.
The basic architecture shown in Figure 2. Panel A also permits
implementing efficient sensorimotor transformations (say reaching
towards the object) not only because it supports the necessary
coordinate transformations regardless of the sensory modality
(e.g., from eye- or head-centric to body-centric FOR) but also
because the BFM serves as an intermediate layer that permits
approximating the nonlinear sensory-to-motor mapping as a
combination of linear problems, see Pouget and Snyder (2000).
As the information can flow in any direction (e.g., from sensory to
motor but also from motor to sensory inputs), the same network
permits also forward modeling and the prediction of the sensory
consequences of actions.
Figure 3 shows a BFN-based neural architecture supporting
reaching actions that combines inputs from multiple (sensory
and motor) modalities. Due to the bidirectional links, it supports
transformations in all directions; for this reason, all the sources of
information, either sensory or motor, can be considered both as
inputs and outputs depending on the task at hand (e.g., a sensori-
motor transformation from vision to action or a prediction from
action to vision).
FIGURE 3 | Putative architecture supporting reaching actions; from
Pouget et al. (2002). Multiple stimuli dimensions, coded in different FORs,
converge into BFMs that support sensorimotor transformations.
FROM INDIVIDUALISTIC TO INTERACTIVE SENSORIMOTOR
TRANSFORMATIONS
We argue that a similar architecture of combined basis func-
tions can support joint action problems and the formation of
a SAS between co-actors when information relative to the co-
actor (e.g., its position, its actions) is linked to the BFMs.
As shown in Figure 4, this can be achieved by extending the
basis function idea of Figure 3. One possibility is that a single
BFM can include sensory and motor modalities of oneself and
another agent (e.g., one’s own and another’s eye, head and/or
body positions). This map would support “individualistic” sen-
sorimotor transformations (e.g., predict only the consequences
of one’s own actions) when it only receives input relative to
oneself. When it also receives inputs relative to another agent, the
same network supports “social” sensorimotor transformations
(e.g., predict the combined consequences of own and another’s
actions). Another possibility, suggested in Figure 4, is that two
separate BFMs code for individualistic and social sensorimotor
transformations. In either way, the BFMs would come to encode
a SAS in the sense that it simultaneously encodes the sensori-
motor transformations of both agents, and beyond (e.g., actions
that they can only do together such as lifting together a heavy
object).
It is worth noting that sensorimotor transformations and
remapping are predictive processes. For example, Duhamel et al.
(1992) showed that receptive fields in LIP shift in the direction
of saccades before the eyes have moved, and this mechanism
maintains the visual scene stable. Similarly, sensorimotor trans-
formations in the SAS are likely to be predictive processes about a
co-actor’s future actions and how shared affordances may develop
accordingly, which, in turn, is necessary for real-time coordina-
tion. In a similar vein, most theories of social interaction and joint
action use the concepts of action simulation and forward modeling
to emphasize that predictive processing is necessary for a correct
unfolding of the interaction dynamics, see Pezzulo et al. (2013)
for a review.
FIGURE 4 | A schematic representation of a BFM supporting
perspective taking and joint actions. See main text for explanation.
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Note that all the associations shown in Figure 4 between
the individual modalities and the BFMs) are bidirectional. This
implies that not only the input modalities influence the BFM,
but also vice versa, and so in principle an input can influ-
ence backward any other input. In “individualistic” sensorimotor
transformations the bidirectionality creates subtle effects (some of
which are empirically observed), including the fact that receptive
fields linked to a given modality (say, auditory) can “shift” and the
amplitude of their response changes when the inputs in any other
modality change (e.g., when eyes are moved) (Pouget et al., 2002).
This suggests the intriguing possibility that in the presence of SAS
the coding of information relative to the others can influence
one’s own multisensory coding. This possibility remains to be
investigated in the future.
A potential problem with our proposal is that while one’s
own body’s sensory and motor information is readily available
through sensation and proprioception, the same is not true for
information concerning a co-actor. However, several studies show
that the boundaries of the body are not fixed and “bodily” repre-
sentations can generalize and respond for example to the touch
of a rubber hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). Furthermore,
there are various brain areas that encode “social” information,
and which could give access to (at least a part of) a co-actor’s
sensory, motor, and affective information, thus providing the
kind of inputs required for our model. One possible source of
information is the superior temporal sulcus (STS) that is implied
in biologicalmotion perception and could encode another’s visual
and postural information (Saygin, 2007). Recently, Kessler and
Miellet (2013) reported the so-called “embodied body-gestalt”
effect (eBG), where the instantaneous posture of the observer
directly impacts on how efficiently occluded bodies of other peo-
ple are integrated into a body gestalt. This seems to suggest that
proprioceptive information, i.e., the own body schema, directly
impacts on the perception of another’s posture and actions,
which could be mediated by combined representations in form
of basis function networks. In extension of the eBG, physiological
evidence exists for combined representations in the perception
of space in relation to another’s body in form of visuo-tactile
neurons that are sensitive to visual stimuli linked to another’s
body (Ishida et al., 2010); see also Thomas et al. (2006).
Furthermore, mirror neurons could give access to informa-
tion relative to another’s actions and their goals (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). Mirror responses are sensitive to the opera-
tional space of perceived agents (Caggiano et al., 2009) and so
could therefore signal the potentialities for interaction and the
utility of integrating another’s actions into one’s own sensorimo-
tor transformations (for example, for executing complementary
actions). Mirror neurons are part of a wider “action observation
network (AON)” that includes parietal, premotor, and occip-
itotemporal regions within the (human) brain and processes
various kinds of information relative to other agents (Kessler
et al., 2006; Biermann-Ruben et al., 2008; Grafton, 2009; Neal
and Kilner, 2010). All this information is potentially relevant as an
input dimension for forming the SAS (i.e., as one of the peripheral
boxes of Figure 4). Furthermore, an intriguing possibility is that
(portions of) the AON might constitute a proper part of the SAS
itself rather than providing one of its inputs. If this is true, social
resonance, mirror responses, and the body-gestalt effect could
be reflections of the such combined representations (formalized
here as BFMs and networks). Finally, resonancemechanisms (e.g.,
empathy for pain, Avenanti et al., 2005) could give access to
another’s affective states that could be useful to modulate the
sensorimotor interaction, see Section Problems and Open Issues
of the Current Proposal.
It is worth noting that all the aforementioned processes act
largely automatically. However, social cognition is supported by
a range of deliberate mechanisms, too, which are often referred
to as a “mentalizing” network (Frith and Frith, 2008). Although
these mechanisms are typically associated with high-level infor-
mation (e.g., inferring the beliefs of other agents) there are
various demonstrations that they can influence social perception
and ongoing action simulations, see Pezzulo et al. (2013) for
a review. This suggests that an additional input can be pro-
vided by deliberate forms of perspective taking and embodied
simulations that differ substantially from automatic effects. In
Section Prerequisites for Forming Shared Action Spaces and a
Proposed Taxonomy we elaborate on the idea that different kinds
of spatial arrangements between the co-actors make some inputs,
but not others, available, determining different characteristics of
the SAS.
Overall, the mechanism shown in Figure 4 can integrate vari-
ous aspects of the co-actor’s sensory, motor, and goal information
(at least after proper training, see later). Although this informa-
tion cannot be as reliable as one’s own proprioception, it could
suffice to support efficient sensorimotor interactions and joint
actions.
HOW JOINT ACTION PROBLEMS ARE RESOLVED WITHIN A SHARED
ACTION SPACE
The SAS exemplified in Figure 4 provides a neuronal substrate
permitting actors to co-represent the other agent(s) and to sup-
port joint actions (or more generally social interactions) effi-
ciently. For example, it could permit perspective taking and the
remapping of egocentric eye-centered coordinates between the
co-actors (providing that an estimate of the co-actor’s position
can be obtained). It could permit taking another’s movements
into consideration when planning an action, which is useful for
avoiding collisions but also for modulating one’s actions so that
the combined effect with the co-actor’s actions is appropriate
(say, when lifting a table together, the table remains stable and
horizontal), or for calculating the combined operational space of
the co-actors, as in the beach volley team example before. Below
we discuss in detail how the SAS permits solving a few selected
problems of joint actions and sensorimotor interactions.
Extending the operational space; multisensory aspects
As we have discussed before, experiments on tool use show that
multisensory representations remap when new skills are acquired,
suggesting that they code for an “operational space” that depends
on action possibilities (e.g., how far I can reach) rather than
absolute position of objects in space. The same multisensory
remapping could occur as a consequence of the formation of a
SAS, in which the action possibilities of co-actors (or more gener-
ally of agents engaged in social interactions) extend. For example,
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a somatosensory remapping could occur as a consequence of
the extended operational space of a team of beach volleyball
players; somatic and visual responses could be elicited that are
linked to parts of the space that can be reached by any of the
team. Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration of an extended
operational space.
In analogy with the aforementioned evidence on tool use, it
can be argued that every player sees the other players as “tools”
that extend their bodies and action possibilities; for example,
stretching the space that can be reached. A study conducted by
Thomas et al. (2006) shows that sensory events can be elicited
that are associated by the body of another person. The authors
propose that such “interpersonal body representations” could be
elicited automatically when seeing another person (thus, engaging
in a joint action is not necessary).
Themultisensory remapping could profoundly change the way
we organize the space around us. A common distinction in spatial
cognition is between peripersonal and extrapersonal space (Previc,
1998). Although different sub-divisions have been proposed, they
are often described in terms of what actions they support (e.g.,
grasping space, ambient extrapersonal space as the space where
visual inputs can be collected), that is in terms of operational
space; see Rizzolatti and Luppino (2001). This conceptualization
suggests the possibility that what is considered a peripersonal or
an extrapersonal space changes as a function of social interactions;
for example, the peripersonal space of a team of beach volleyball
players could combine the individual peripersonal spaces with
mixed ownership. In this case, the extended operational space
consists of two peripersonal spaces with overlapping parts. Sim-
ilarly, the extrapersonal space that normally is mapped by visual
or acoustic modalities (but also olfactory; Koulakov and Rinberg,
2011) should be influenced by social interaction. A portion of
the visual space hidden by an obstacle could be re-integrated
in the internal representation of the extrapersonal space using
information provided by co-actors.
Extending the operational space; motor aspects
Up to the moment we have discussed somatosensory remap-
ping. However, extending the operational space also changes
what affordances and action possibilities are available. Twenty
years of research on mirror mechanisms have shown that mon-
keys and humans code for goal-directed actions performed
by other agents in a flexible way (Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004) and can consider several details including the operational
space of the agents (Caggiano et al., 2009) and the possibil-
ity of complementary actions (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007;
for review see Kessler and Garrod, 2013). Other studies sug-
gest that humans can code for the action possibilities of other
agents, too, and that objects can activate affordances both when
they are in one’s own and another’s reaching space (Costantini
et al., 2010, 2011a,b). This evidence can be linked to the idea
of a SAS that is extended compared to the individual action
space. The SAS sketched in Figure 4 is modulated by both one’s
actions and another’s actions, and one’s affordances and another’s
affordances.
This information, once coded in the SAS, can be used for
performing joint actions. For example, a beach volley player
can use the model shown in Figure 4 to predict whether or
not a teammate will catch the ball and so prepare in advance a
complementary action.
Note that in the beach volleyball example the operational space
is the combination of the individual operational spaces. There
are other cases in which the presence of two or more co-actors
creates truly novel possibilities for action. Consider for example
an agent facing the problem of producing the necessary actions
(including body and arms posture, force, etc.) to lift a heavy object
together with a co-actor. The object cannot be lifted by any of the
agents, but can be lifted if both combine their efforts. A problem
is how an individual agent can form a motor plan or predict the
consequences of a joint action. If she can only use her internal
models (e.g., forward models) without taking into consideration
her co-actors actions, she cannot generate the sensory prediction
that the heavy object will be lifted. However, if her sensorimotor
transformations are based on a SAS, her/their forward model can
consider the combined effects of her and the co-actor’s actions,
and predict effects that cannot be produced by individual actions.
In a similar way, a SAS could permit an agent to incorporate
another’s motor acts (e.g., the force that she will apply) into
his own plans and mesh them for more accurate control and
prediction.
It is important to distinguish between action goals that are
congruent between the agents (e.g., imitation of martial arts
movements during practice), that are complementary between
the agents (e.g., during standard dance), and that are competitive
(e.g., during martial arts competition). For instance, these goals
may directly influence how information about another’s action
space is integrated into the egocentric basis-function map(s).
That is, one could think of another modulation in form of a
basis function (e.g., sigmoid as in Figure 2A) that would reflect
space/action selection likelihood, thus, resulting in dynamically
augmented vs. inhibited spaces and actions. These space/action
landscapes could dramatically differ depending on goals that are
congruent, complementary, or competitive. For example, when
imitation of amovement is required the basis function would aug-
ment the same action as expected/observed in the other agent. For
a complementary or a competitive joint action the identical action
expected/observed in another agent would be suppressed while
an appropriate complementary action (that could be defensive or
aggressive in the competitive case) would be augmented. These
examples illustrate that the functioning and even the coding of
BFMs are highly task- and goal-dependent.
Multisensory integration
The mechanism shown in Figure 4 permits combining the action
space of two (or more) individuals. In turn, this permits inte-
grating perceptual and motor streams of two or more individuals,
which might prove useful for example for state estimation. Con-
sider the problem of estimating the position or trajectory of an
object lying between two persons (say a ball in beach volleyball).
An actor’s eye/head coordinates of the ball are mapped onto her
body/hand coordinates for action. At the same time, these are
combined with the action space of the other person forming a
SAS. Within the shared space, sensory and motor information of
the other person can be integrated as well that might help forming
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a more robust estimation of the ball trajectory or position. For
example, an actor can use the co-actor’s movements (e.g., if she
moves towards the ball or not) as an additional source of evidence
for estimating the ball (actual and future) position.
Perceptual perspective taking and the remapping between frames
of reference
As mentioned in the previous sections, the social context itself
as input could have a direct modulatory effect on the combined
representations in the basis function network(s) triggering a tran-
sition from an individualistic to a social or SAS. This may result
in a combined operational space (a BFM of higher complexity,
cf. Figure 4) or in a full switch to another action-guiding FOR;
in other words perspective taking. In Section Prerequisites for
Forming Shared Action Spaces and a Proposed Taxonomy we will
describe in detail the spatial conditions under which perspective
taking becomes necessary, while it is essential at this stage to
point out the importance of the social context. In specific social
situations, e.g., in a formal or hierarchical context such as a job
interview, it is more likely that we adopt the other’s FOR (i.e., the
interviewer’s perspective) than when chatting to a friend. Kessler
(2000) proposed that such a direct influence of social context
could also be represented as a combination of basis functions,
where the likelihood of adopting the other’s FOR (or any other
non-egocentric FOR) increases with the formality/hierarchy (see
Tversky and Hard, 2009, for other dimensions) of the social
context (cf. the eye/head model by Pouget and Sejnowski (1995,
1996) shown in Figure 2A, where “formality of social context”
would be quantified on the y-axis and “FOR orientation” on the
x-axis).
While social context could mediate the likelihood for adopting
another’s FOR, the transformation process between the egocen-
tric and the other’s FOR is a somewhat different matter. We
propose that under specific circumstances, i.e., when people are
spatially aligned the transformation between the egocentric FOR
and the other’s FOR could be computationally equivalent to the
usual re-mappings of coordinate frames (say from eye- to hand-
centered) necessary for the individual to plan and control reach-
ing and grasping actions (see next sections for details). Evidence
indicates that such egocentric-to-egocentric remapping can give
access to sources of evidence that are unavailable to any of the two
original perspectives (Becchio et al., 2013).
In contrast to the case when people’s viewpoints are aligned,
when their viewpoints are mis-aligned their operational spaces
cannot be easily merged and an action-guiding FOR must be
chosen or negotiated (see next sections for details). This could be
the FOR of one of the agents but some joint actions could ben-
efit from adopting a common allocentric (e.g., object-centered)
FOR, where it could be easier to exert detailed control over the
combined effects of actions (e.g., ensuring that a lifted table
remains horizontal). Although it remains largely unknown what
coordinate frames are used during joint action, evidence indicates
that joint attention can change the FOR from an egocentric to an
allocentric one (Bockler et al., 2011).
In either case the transformation of the egocentric into a
mis-aligned target FOR (either the other person’s or an allo-
centic FOR) is not easily described by means of combined
basis functions. However, recent evidence suggests that this
transformation process could be a gradual transformation within
the body schema map(s) of the perspective taker (Kessler and
Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Kessler and Wang,
2012) that can be described as a shift within basis function
networks. Kessler (2000) proposed a network model that used
shifter circuits (Van Essen and Anderson, 1990) to shift the
egocentric FOR orientation via intermediate orientations into the
target orientation congruent to a simulated body rotation (Kessler
and Thomson, 2010), which would be equivalent to the use of
sensorimotor basis function networks in a “simulation mode”.
That is, the anticipated sensorimotor and visuo-spatial outcomes
are generated within the (individualistic) operational space by
gradual orientation shifts without actually executing the usually
associated movement. The result would be a spatially updated
operational space with a simulated (egocentric) viewpoint as ori-
gin that would be spatially aligned with an allocentric or the other
agent’s FOR.
PROBLEMS AND OPEN ISSUES OF THE CURRENT PROPOSAL
Despite its attractiveness, the basis function framework is com-
putationally complex and prone to scalability problems; these
problems could be magnified in social domains. Below we
shortly discuss potential problems and open issues linked to our
proposal.
An open issue is specifying how the computations linked to
the SAS (e.g., the basis functions in the BFMs) are learned in
the first place. In parietal cortex, mechanisms supporting sen-
sorimotor transformations only arise after training and can be
flexibly modified by new experience. In the same way, we propose
that the SAS and in particular the basis functions required for
the sensorimotor transformations are formed through learning.
Humans and other social species often learn sensorimotor skills
(e.g., lifting objects together with somebody other, playing volley-
ball) while engaged in social interactions and could acquire SAS
as part of the sensorimotor learning. Of course the quality of the
social skills and SAS depend also on the nature of the training;
sensorimotor transformations can be more or less reliable when
we play volleyball with our usual partners or when we interact
with a stranger (the differences are also due to the success or
failure of other mechanisms such as mindreading). Given that the
computations of the basis function framework are hard even in
individual domains, it is unclear if and how it can scale up to
“social” sensorimotor skills. A scheme that is often used for scala-
bility is making the architecture more modular. In this sense, it is
possible to hypothesize that the formation of a SAS could require
forming new BFMs specialized for social interactions rather than
(or in addition to) reusing and extending existing ones. Testing
these possibilities empirically is an interesting direction for future
research.
Another open issue is what is the better FOR for perform-
ing joint actions such as lifting an object together or passing
on an object. In some cases, a natural FOR can be the body
position/orientation of one of the two actors (e.g., the actor who
receives the object) (Tversky and Hard, 2009). This FOR permits
controlling the action from the point of view of the receiving agent
so that for example the “end-state comfort” (Rosenbaum et al.,
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2001) of the receiving agent can be optimized; as an example,
the giver agent can pass an object to the receiver agent so that
she grasps it comfortably (e.g., grasps a cup from the handle). In
other cases, such as for example in symmetric joint actions (e.g.,
lifting an object together), an allocentric (object-centered) FOR
can be used. Still another intriguing possibility is that joint actions
benefit from creating novel “we-centered” frames of references,
for instance a FOR that is centered between my body and your
body, and novel metrics such as “relative to the distance between
you and me” and “the sum of my force and your force”. The
peculiarity of these metrics is that they are modified by the
actions of both actors (e.g., the distance between you and me
changes as an effect of my actions and your actions). They could
be particularly efficacious for formulating some joint control
problems, such as for example monitoring the distance between
two volleyball players while performing a defence (Pezzulo, 2013).
The fact that social groups (or teams) are hierarchically organized
could further influence the form and extension of the SAS. A
related problem is that it remains unclear so far, how different
forms of spatial alignments and social requirements affect the
selection or merging of individualistic FORs for establishing a
common action space. This issue will be addressed in the next
section where propose a taxonomy of SAS.
In the present model we are assuming that during social
interactions agents perform with similar motivations. This is
often untrue. One of the two volleyball players, in our example,
could be more/less motivated during the match because of a
larger/smaller expected personal reward. As a consequence, his
influence on actions produced in the SAS will have more/less
strength and the partner has-to/could adapt for optimal perfor-
mance. Neural modulation for self and other reward outcome
expectation/monitoring has been shown in different areas of the
frontal lobe of primates (Chang et al., 2013) and the estimate
of self/other motivational variables have been proposed to act
as a gain modulation during common FOR generation (Chang,
2013). In this respect, a related issue to be considered is the
level of each agent’s altruism, strongly influencing behavior, as
revealed by all neurobiological studies exploiting game theory
based approaches to decision making (Tankersley et al., 2007;
Lee, 2008; Waytz et al., 2012). Because of these and other impor-
tant factors influencing social interaction, the amount of shared
space used by each individual and the number and contribu-
tion of actions to common goals are expected to be negotiable
and more dynamic than what we are describing with our over
simplification.
Finally, both the present model and most of the studies that
explored action space of individuals and joint actions all dealt
with agents unmoving. However, during a beach volley match
every player changes his position continuously and so do the
teammates. The same argument could be valid for describing
synergic actions directed to objects that will change their position
in space as a consequence of the cooperation. In all these cases,
the SAS is dynamically updated in extension and boundaries in
a non-easily predictable way. In this situation, a body-centered
FOR of the action space could facilitate this continuous update
of the representation of overlapped portions of the space more
than an object-based or extra-personal FOR. Thus, our model
is partial for describing all possible sources and forms of action
space sharing and will require further aspects to be included in
the future.
PREREQUISITES FOR FORMING SHARED ACTION SPACES
AND A PROPOSED TAXONOMY
Up to now we discussed basic forms of integrating individualistic
action spaces and hinted that different forms or mechanisms
could be employed depending on social and spatial factors. One
important distinction was made in relation to different action
goals. We distinguished between action goals that are congruent
between agents (e.g., imitation of martial arts movements during
practice), that are complementary between agents (e.g., during
standard dance), and that are competitive (e.g., during martial
arts competition). These goals directly influence how information
about another’s action space is integrated into basis-function
maps, resulting in dynamically augmented vs. inhibited spaces
and actions. While the goals differ, all these operations assume
that the two action spaces can be directly merged into a shared
space. However, direct merging might not always be appropriate
and in the current section we will elaborate on the different
mechanisms for combining spaces that define different types
of SAS. Note however, that all shared spaces and combinatory
mechanisms can be explained within the proposed basis function
framework.
We propose a taxonomy that distinguishes between “merged”
vs. “aligned” shared spaces, based on different social requirements
and spatial characteristics of the interaction. This distinction is
based on two main dimensions that characterize a joint action sit-
uation: (i) the social sophistication of the joint goal(s) and action
requirements, in contrast to (ii) the spatial orientation/viewpoint
difference between the two agents. The first dimension determines
how much complexity and sophistication is required for one
agent to represent the other’s experience of the world and their
potential actions therein. The second dimension determines what
mechanisms an agent can employ for mentally sharing an action
space with the other (self-other mapping) depending primarily
on the spatial layout between the two agents and their FORs
(i.e., orientation difference) as well as other available FORs in the
environment.
ACTION REQUIREMENTS OF A SITUATION
It is important to distinguish between situations with low-level
requirements for co-representation where individualistic action
spaces can be combined via automatic resonance mechanisms
(i.e., mirroring, e.g., Kessler and Garrod, 2013) or low level view-
point matching, from situations with high-level requirements,
where more explicit and controlled mental alignment is required
(Kessler and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Miellet, 2013).
Low-level requirements (and Level-1 perspective taking)
As described in relation to Figure 1, the three agents might simply
need to represent the overlap between their individualistic action
spaces for placing the cup within “easy reach” of another agent. In
general, situations like these would only require superimposing
the egocentric and the other agents’ action spaces within a shared
space, identifying areas of overlap. Another agent’s position,
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viewpoint or orientation in space matters only to the extent
that it shapes their region of direct influence in relation to the
egocentric space and those of any other agents. In these cases the
individualistic action spaces can be directly merged according to
the basis-function framework proposed above.
It is important to note that such low-level requirements and
the associated merging of action spaces are also proposed to apply
to the simplest form of perspective taking. Typically, perspective
taking is regarded as a high-level, deliberate process of social
cognition, yet, two different forms or levels of complexity have
been identified (Flavell et al., 1981; Michelon and Zacks, 2006)
and should be considered here. Level-1 perspective taking refers
to understandingwhat another person perceives or not (e.g., what
is visible to them or not), while Level-2 perspective taking refers
to a deeper understanding of how another person experiences the
world. The distinction is evidenced by different developmental
onset ages (Level-1 ∼2 years; Level-2 ∼4–5 years) and cross-
species differences, where certain forms of Level-1 perspective
taking seem to be shared with other species, whereas Level-2 has
so far been only conclusively identified in humans (Tomasello
et al., 2005; Bräuer et al., 2007; Emery and Clayton, 2009).
This highlights the differences in complexity between the two
levels, bolstering our argument that in situations where Level-1
perspective taking can resolve viewpoint/orientation differences,
individualistic action spaces can be directly merged into a shared
space. In the visual domain Level-1 perspective taking seems to
be based on a mechanism that infers the line-of-sight of another
agent based on their gaze information (Michelon and Zacks,
2006). In the present context and based on Pouget’s basis-function
framework such a representation could be easily and directly
transformed into body-related rather than head/eye-centred
coordinates, allowing for judgments of “reachability” in addition
to visibility. For instance, in a situation where it is only necessary
to team off and grasp objects that are hidden from the other per-
son’s view, then it is only important to represent the other’s line-
of-sight to determine which actions will have to be performed
by ourselves and which the other agent has available (Michelon
and Zacks, 2006; Kessler and Rutherford, 2010). These two action
spaces could be directly merged as no transformation is required
beyond representing the others’ action space in relation to their
body orientation and gaze direction; see Seyama and Nagayama
(2005) for the integration between body orientation and gaze
direction perceived in others. In general, coordinating actions
that refer to very simple spatial relationships between agents and
potential target objects will allow for direct merging of the agents’
action-spaces.
High-level requirements (and Level-2 perspective taking)
In contrast other social goals require more a sophisticated com-
bination of action-spaces in form of alignment. This is the
case for instance, when the spatial inter-relationship between
agents and/or objects, such as “visibility”, are not enough but
specific directional information (e.g., left vs. right) in relation
to a particular origin or FOR is required. Specific mental trans-
formations of the egocentric FOR of one agent into another
are necessary in order to achieve such alignment (e.g., Kessler
and Rutherford, 2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010). The higher
cognitive effort allows for more differentiated SAS where origin-
specific directions can be distinguished and where the other’s
body laterality is represented. For instance, one could directly
determine if the other person uses their right or left hand/foot
for an action. The default neurocomputational mechanism for
the required transformation could be a simulated rotation of
orientation in multiple basis-function maps, i.e., in multiple
combined sensorimotor representations that constitute the inter-
nal body schema (e.g., Andersen, 1994; Pouget and Snyder,
2000).
Furthermore, if one agent mentally adopts another agent’s
viewpoint for a more complex representational alignment, then
this process can be congruent to Level-2 spatial perspective
taking (Kessler and Rutherford, 2010). However, agents could
also choose/negotiate to use neither of their FORs but a third,
“allocentric” FOR instead and where both agents would have to
accomplish a mental transformation into that FOR. Such a FOR
could be in relation to a fronted object (e.g., the left or right
side of a car), also called intrinsic allocentric or in relation to
more absolute features of the environment (such as “north”), also
called absolute allocentric (see Figure 5). For instance, volleyball
players might not only represent a SAS relative to each other
but in relation to the allocentric alignment of the playing field,
thus, optimizing their SAS relative to the purpose of the game
(i.e., they are typically facing the net and their adversaries).
All these processes are usually strongly influenced by learning,
after including in the own representation all potential sources
of information useful for common goals. The transformation
can be mechanistically congruent for alignment with another
person or with an allocentric FOR and has been characterized
as an embodied simulation of a body rotation. However, the
social goals may substantially differ: alignment with an allocentric
FOR would pursue the goal of imagining the self in that virtual
perspective, in contrast to the goal of imagining another’s visuo-
spatial experience in the case of alignment with another person’s
FOR (see Figure 5).
Finally, disregarding which FOR is chosen in a given context,
an embodied mental transformation into that FOR’s orienta-
tion only becomes necessary when the difference in orientation
between the egocentric and the target FOR surpasses a certain
angular disparity. This is where our second taxonomic dimension
regarding spatial orientation differences ties in with our consider-
ations so far.
SPATIAL ORIENTATION/VIEWPOINT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
AGENTS (AND FORS)
The spatial/physical orientation difference between two agents
can be crucial for how easy their action spaces can be merged.
Merging refers to the direct integration of action spaces in the pro-
posed basis function framework. If the two agents stand/sit next
to each other, sharing a viewpoint, then their action-spaces can be
easily merged disregarding the complexity of their joint goal—at
all levels of complexity the mapping of their individualistic spaces
into a shared space will be a direct merging operation. Neverthe-
less the complexity of the goal may determine what aspects of the
action-space are represented at all (e.g., mere visibility vs. more
sophisticated laterality). We propose to identify this case as the
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FIGURE 5 | Taxonomy for SAS divided into types (blue), origins (green),
and action goals (orange). SAS can be of the “aligned” or “merged” type,
with the latter subdivided into “common” and “joint” subtypes. The origin
of an SAS can remain within the egocentric FOR or can be transformed into
another origin (“altercentric”) imposed by another agent
(“other(agent)-centred”), an intrinsically fronted object (“intrinsic
allocentric), or an absolute feature of the environment such as “north”
(“absolute allocentric”). Goals can be “congruent”, “complementary”, or
“competitive”. Further explanations are provided in the text.
“common” shared space subtype of “merged” action spaces (see
Figure 5).
If the angular disparity between the agents increases, then the
effort of combining their action-spaces increases as well. Typically
there is a discrete jump in cognitive effort (e.g., response times) at
around 60–90◦ where the overlap between the two FORs dimin-
ishes (Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Janczyk, 2013). However, this
increase in effort is only the case for joint action goals that
require sophisticated spatial alignment (Kessler and Rutherford,
2010). In the case of simple goals, individualistic action spaces
can still be directly merged, disregarding orientation differences,
since actions are only constrained by origin-independent spatial
relationships between agents and objects such as “visibility” and
“reachability” (see Section Low-Level Requirements (and Level-1
Perspective Taking)). That is, action spaces can bemerged directly
even for agents being positioned face to face (=180◦ angular
disparity). Figure 1 exemplifies this in form of S5 that defines
the reachability overlap between Persons 2 and 3. As described
earlier (see previous sections) merging operations are likely
to rely on resonance mechanisms that automatically map the
observer’s body repertoire (actions, postures) and instantaneous
body schema onto an observed person (Kessler andMiellet, 2013).
We propose to label this type of shared space as “joint” action
space. The individualistic action spaces are merged, yet in contrast
to a common action space, the agent’s viewpoints and orientations
are not physically aligned.
In the case of complex goals, the two agents would have to
settle on a particular FOR and mentally align their egocentric
FOR with it to establish an “aligned” SAS. As proposed above, the
default neurocomputational mechanism for the required trans-
formation could be a simulated rotation of orientation inmultiple
basis-function maps, hence, the transformation can be resolved
within the proposed framework. Once such a transformation into
a common FOR has been accomplished there are at least two
options for how this may affect the SAS. Note that we propose that
a particular transformation indeed only needs to be conducted
once for establishing the transition into the dominant FOR, but
subsequently this FOR-dependent action-space will either replace
the initially egocentric one or induce a specification of additional
subspaces in a merged “joint” egocentric action space (e.g., my
“left” is their “right” and vice versa) conform to the proposed
basis function framework. Alternatively, however, several SAS
might co-exist in concordance to the observation that several
FORs can be simultaneously represented in typical (Furlanetto
et al., 2013) as well as atypical neuro-cognitive processing (i.e.,
in heautoscopy, Brugger et al., 1997; Blanke and Mohr, 2005;
Braithwaite et al., 2013). These are clearly hypothetical statements
and further research is needed.
One exception to embodied transformation being the default
mechanism at higher angular disparities (for complex require-
ments) may occur when the two agents are positioned face to
face (=180◦ angular disparity). In this particular configuration
agents may employ a different strategy by simply reversing their
own egocentric space, for instance, “my left is your right” (Kessler
and Wang, 2012). Again, this may feed into the specification of
subspaces in a “joint” egocentric action space.
In summary we propose that socially shared space is not
unitary and the following main features of the social and spatial
configuration have to be taken into consideration for the way
individualistic action spaces are combined into a shared space: (1)
Below 60–90◦ of angular disparity between agents, merging into a
SAS with a common egocentric FOR could occur directly, disre-
garding complexity of social requirements; (2) Angular disparities
above 60–90◦ together with low-level requirements (e.g., “reacha-
bility”)may still be based on direct merging into a joint egocentric
action space; yet, this egocentric FOR is not in common with
the other agent; (3) Angular disparities above 60–90◦ together
with high-level requirements (e.g., precise left/right distinctions)
necessitate a transformation of the egocentric body schema into
the orientation of another agent or into a common allocentric
FOR in order to achieve an aligned action space with a common
FOR. Strategies other than embodied transformation are possible,
e.g., mental calculation (“my left is your right”) at 180◦.
FINALIZING AND EXEMPLIFYING THE TAXONOMY
We initially distinguished between action goals that are congruent
between agents (e.g., imitation of martial arts movements during
practice), that are complementary between agents (e.g., during
standard dance), and that are competitive (e.g., during martial
arts competition). These goals directly influence how information
about another’s action space is integrated into basis-function
maps, resulting in dynamically augmented vs. inhibited spaces
and actions. Based on the above considerations we propose the
following taxonomy of SAS. Primarily, we suggest distinguishing
between merged vs. aligned shared spaces. While merged action
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spaces remain basically egocentric but are extended to incorporate
the other’s action space, aligned spaces require a mental trans-
formation into another FOR. In addition, for merged spaces we
propose two further sub-types, resulting in three types overall (see
Figure 5).
Firstly, a merging process may result in a common action
space, which is the likely outcome when the agents are spa-
tially/physically aligned (i.e., identical viewpoints). The resulting
SAS can be directly described within the proposed basis-function
framework. Common action-spaces could easily represent simple
as well as sophisticated action requirements (e.g., place the cup
into another’s “visible” vs. “right” space) since there is little or no
discrepancy between individualistic FORs.
Secondly, joint action-spaces could be classified as spaces that
have been directly merged despite strong orientation/viewpoint
differences between the agents and their FORs. This is only possi-
ble with rather simplistic joint goals that only require determining
“reachability”, “visibility” or other simple agent-to-object and
agent-to-agent relationships (e.g., Level-1 perspective taking).
Joint spaces can be directly represented within the proposed basis-
function framework (cf. previous sections).
Thirdly, we propose that aligned action-spaces should denote
combined spaces that have not been merged in a strict sense, but
where, for instance, a dominant target FOR has been negotiated,
which is shared between the agents (either one of the agents’
FORs or another intrinsic- or absolute-allocentric FOR). These
action-spaces are likely to emerge in relation to sophisticated
goals and interactions, requiring complex co-representation of
another agent’s experience of the world and their potential actions
therein (i.e., Level-2 perspective taking). The transformation into
alignment is effortful and has been characterized (Kessler, 2000)
as a simulated change of orientation within multiple combined
sensorimotor representations (i.e., networks of basis-function
maps) identified as the body schema that constitutes the egocen-
tric FOR (Andersen, 1994; Pouget and Sejnowski, 1995, 1996).
Thus, aligned action spaces can also be described within the
basis-function framework; albeit, as a transformation- rather
than a merging operation. Also note that after establishing FOR
alignment, the resulting sub-space characterization could be used
as input to specify a joint action-space within the basis-function
framework, thus, not requiring further effortful transformation.
Hence, it may well be that aspects of all three types of shared
spaces could dynamically contribute to a single interaction, espe-
cially if more than two agents are involved (cf. Figure 1). To re-
iterate, there is also the very interesting possibility that several
shared space representations may co-exist simultaneously (e.g.,
joint and aligned) according to the observation, for instance in
heautoscopy (for reviews see Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Furlanetto
et al., 2013), that several perspectives or FORs may be represented
in parallel.
Accordingly, the agents’ configuration in Figure 1 can be
interpreted in different ways. Firstly, if the joint goal is to simply
transfer the cup to the far side of Agent 3, then all three action
spaces S1-S3 could be directly merged into a SAS. Note, however
that each person would represent the other two in different ways,
thus their shared space representations will differ, yet, for success-
ful completion a few important aspects would be “meta-shared”
(meaning that two ormore agents have congruent representations
in this respect), such as the overlapping action spaces (S4, S5).
In this particular example Agent 1 would only need to (represent
and) place the cup into S4, then Agent 2 would need to (represent
and) take the cup from S4 and (represent and) pass it into S5,
where Agent 3 (represents and) takes the cup, finally placing it
into her egocentric left subspace of S3. Note however, that Agents
1 and 2 share their orientation, so their merged action space
(including the overlapping subspace S4) is a common space, while
Agents 2 and 3 merge their action spaces into a joint space as they
are oriented face to face. Thus, their individual representation of
the joint action space will have different origins, based within
each agent’s egocentric orientation, however, this would not affect
actions in relation to the overlapping space S5 as long as the joint
action requirement remains simple (e.g., “placing the cup within
reach”).
Secondly, for more sophisticated inter- and joint-actions the
individualistic action spaces would have to be merged or com-
bined in more sophisticated ways that specify more detail about
subspaces. Agents 1 and 2 are physically aligned in space and
would therefore generate a common shared space for substantial
parts of the space surrounding them: The left side of S1 is to the
left of both agents while the right side of S2 is also to the right of
both agents. However, the quite crucial space in-between the two
agents, S4, is ambiguous with respect to left/right labeling. The
agents would have to determine that this subspace has opposite
labels for each agent (i.e., “right” for S4 vs. S1, but “left” for S4
vs. S2) and include these into the shared space. According to our
taxonomy the resulting shared space would then be amix between
a common and a joint space.
Similar considerations apply to Agents 2 and 3. Here the ori-
entations differ dramatically (180◦), so their entire action spaces
(S2 vs. S3) will have opposite left/right labels. Again a mental
calculation could quickly determine this opposite labeling and
include these as subspace specifications within a joint action space
(“left” within S2 is “right” within S3 and vice versa). Alternatively,
at greater expense, one of the agents (e.g., Agent 2) could adopt
the other’s perspective (Agent 3) and mentally align her action
space with the other’s egocentric FOR. This would result in an
aligned action space with the same origin for both agents (centred
on Agent 3) and with identical left/right labels for both individ-
ualistic action spaces (S2 and S3). Such abstract considerations
become highly relevant in particular social contexts. For instance,
if Agent 3 is a child who is not yet very skilled in grasping a
cup and/or the content is hot, then Agent 2 (e.g., the mother)
might anticipate more precisely where and how to place the cup
within S5: Placing the cup in the child’s “right” space with the
handle turned towards the child’s right hand, would significantly
facilitate the child’s task, yet, make it considerably harder for the
mother in terms of specifying the child’s “right” subspace (which
is actually the mother’s egocentric “left”) within a joint or an
aligned SAS.
SOCIO-COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE SHARED ACTION SPACE
It may require extensive practice to generate SAS that lead to
successful execution of joint actions. The mother and child exam-
ple may only require the mother’s ability to conduct perspective
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taking and the child’s ability to grasp a handle for maximising
the chances of success. Other joint actions require shared action
plans that have to be extensively practiced alongside individual
skills in order to maximise success. This would be the case for
a beach volleyball team where the two players would learn to
represent the other’s action space in relation to their own and to
the playing field. Furthermore the two SAS representations that
each player generates would need to have substantial features in
common for avoiding misunderstandings, collisions, etc. Hence,
practice will have to improve their individual playing skills, their
representation of the other’s actions in a SAS, as well as the
compatibility of their SAS at meta-level.
Up to now we have primarily considered perceptual, spatial
and action-related determinants of SAS, such as the relative
position of the two actors. Additional aspects such as the exact
goals, action requirements and the social context play a crucial
role but have only been assumed so far. However, it is likely
that the formation and use of the SAS depend on socio-cognitive
determinants such as the level of trust between the agents, group
membership (in-group vs. out-group), etc. For example, recent
evidence indicates that social exclusion is a determinant of action
co-representation (Ambrosini et al., 2013; Costantini and Ferri,
2013).
Which FOR is chosen as the common, action-guiding FOR
of a SAS can therefore depend on a variety of context factors
such as the social relationship between the agents (e.g., hierarchy),
the bodily ability for action (e.g., skill level, injury), or general
characteristics of the social situation (e.g., “formality” of the
situation as described in previous sections). Resuming our beach
volleyball example, the SAS would differ if both players were
equally good compared to when one player would clearly be the
lead player, or if one player was a child or a learner, or if one
player had suffered injury, e.g., was playing with an incapacitated
arm affecting their action space on one particular side. It is
also quite easy to imagine that SAS in this example would be
quite different if it was a competitive game compared to more
leisurely play.
In social structures with strong hierarchy, subjects tend to
asymmetrically use their peripersonal/personal space. In military
interactions, high-ranking agents use (move in) relatively more
space than low-ranking agents (Dean et al., 1975). Signal inte-
gration is also influenced by social interaction. Heed et al. (2010)
showed that the level of multisensory integration in peripersonal
space is influenced by others actions in the same space and use of
sensory signals.
We have used the example of tool-use to introduce the aug-
mented space representation that usually follows agent-to-agent
interaction. However, we are aware that a tool could only assume
a passive role; there is no level of cooperation or interaction that
could be described in tool-use. Thus, an important difference to
tool-based extensions of an action space is that in agent-to-agent
interaction spaces continuity of “force transmission” is not always
important. In other words, tools but not other agents need to
be physically manipulated. In the example of Figure 1, Agent 1
and Agent 3 have a common goal and successfully collaborate,
both accessing the motor repertoire of Agent 2, without physically
sharing parts of their peripersonal space. Recent research suggest
that action co-representation between agents (Sebanz et al., 2003)
also emerges when actors are positioned in different rooms but
believe they are collaborating (Tsai et al., 2006). Thus, physical
interaction may not be a necessary condition for social collab-
oration and SAS but it seems to facilitate sharing in specific
experimental scenarios, see e.g., Guagnano et al. (2010). Finally,
it should be noted that social information has various levels of
complexity and some subjects could only be able to share some
of it. Autistic subjects have difficulties with sharing high-level
social information; in particular with all functions included in
so-called “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen, 2000), however they
display normal access to low-level social information (Sebanz
et al., 2005).
CONCLUSIONS
Although it is well known that agents can have their abilities aug-
mented by acting together with others, it in unclear how the brain
mechanistically implements this process. Several mechanisms
have been proposed that include entrainment, mutual prediction
(Wilson and Knoblich, 2005), the sharing of representations
(Sebanz et al., 2006), and a collective, we-mode of representation
(Gallotti and Frith, 2013). In this article we argue that (at least
some forms of) social interaction and social cognition (including
cooperative and competitive ones) might be supported by the
“social” re-use and re-calibration of the neuronal mechanisms
for sensorimotor transformations and multisensory integration
(Pouget et al., 2002).
We propose a basis function framework for social recalibra-
tion of sensorimotor representations; the resulting SAS are an
embodied basis for joint action and sustained spatial and social
perspective alignment. Coding the extended operational space
and the social affordances created by the presence of co-actors in
terms of basis functions for one’s own, another’s and joint actions
could constitute a parsimonious solution to most interaction
problems. This is especially evident if one assumes an ideomotor
theory in which actions are coded in terms of their distal effects
(Hommel et al., 2001). Co-actors sharing or merging their opera-
tional spaces can plausibly better plan, achieve, and monitor their
joint goals. Future research would have to empirically assess our
claims and in particular the proposed neuronal coding supporting
“social” sensorimotor transformations that we have putatively
identified as BFMs.
A second important direction for future research is under-
standing if and how the mechanisms that we described for spatial
perspective taking can be considered as an example from which
we can extrapolate to other, more complex forms of perspective
taking and social cognition. Indeed, there are various demonstra-
tions that during social interactions and in particular joint actions
co-actors share representations and “align” at multiple levels,
besides purely spatial alignments; some examples are mimicry of
behavior, sharing of cognitive representations and formation of
a linguistic common ground (e.g., during linguistic exchanges)
(Clark, 1996; Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Sebanz et al., 2006;
Garrod and Pickering, 2009).
Spatial and cognitive forms of alignment have several similari-
ties and could use similar computational principles (although not
necessarily the same neuronal mechanisms). For example, a key
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aspect of the SAS is that it can be used for both planning one’s
own actions and predicting another’s actions. The same feature
is usually attributed to the common ground that is established
during linguistic conversations (Clark, 1996) and to shared rep-
resentations during joint actions (Sebanz et al., 2006).
Furthermore, we have emphasized that the SAS supports the
alignment of individual FORs; one example would be the selec-
tion of a FOR centred on the body of the receiving person during
a handout action. In a similar but more simplistic way, auto-
matic mechanisms of resonance and mutual emulation are often
advocated for the alignment of behavior (Bargh and Chartrand,
1999; Kessler and Miellet, 2013) and other forms of sharing and
alignment (Garrod and Pickering, 2009), which in turn facilitate
coordination.
In addition to automatic mechanisms co-actors can also adopt
intentional strategies to form or calibrate a SAS. For example, co-
actors (or a teacher and a student) can align spatially so that their
operational spaces optimally overlap and the sensorimotor trans-
formation does not require a complex rotation. In a similar way,
intentional strategies of signaling help aligning the individualistic
representations-for-action and “negotiating” a common plan for
action (Pezzulo and Dindo, 2011); for example, a volleyball player
can exaggerate her movements to signal a teammate that she is
doing a left pass. Common ground formation during linguistic
exchanges can help aligning the interlocutors’ situation models,
which in turn facilitate the interaction. Future studies would be
needed to assess if all these processes link to our proposal of SAS.
This discussion suggests that spatial and cognitive forms of
perspective taking are not disconnected but rather have bidirec-
tional influences. In this vein, Spivey (2012) has argued that the
spatial intersection of individuals is always also an intersection
of minds, because portions of shared space are occupied by
another cognitive agent whose cognitive states can intersect with
one’s own.
However, it is still unclear what are the mechanisms regulat-
ing the interactions between sharing action space and sharing
cognitive representations. One simple explanation is that the
mechanisms regulating spatial alignment and those regulating
cognitive and affective evaluation (e.g., beliefs, liking, trust) of
other persons are both regulated along the similar “positive—
negative” dimension, and this can create positive feedback loops.
For example, sharing a spatial operational space (or performing
a joint action) can improve the positive beliefs (or affective reac-
tions) and increase the trust in another person. In turn, because
the persons now trust more one another, they come closer to one
another and this in turn facilitates the sharing of their action
space. The same mechanism can produce distrust and prevent
the sharing of action spaces in other (e.g., competitive) situa-
tions. The plausibility of this hypothesis remains to be assessed
empirically.
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